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PROPENSITIES IN A NON-DETERMINISTIC PHYSICS*
ABSTRACT. Propensities are presented as a generalization of classical determrnrsm.
They describe a physicai reality intermediary between Laplacian determinism and pure
randomness, such as in quantum mechanics. They are characterized by the fact that their
values are determined by the collection of all actual properties. It is argued that thev do
not satisfy Koimogorov axioms; other axioms are proposed.
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The word 'probability' covers several concepts, but not all concepts
have something to do with the probability of a non-necessary physical
event. The Kolmogorov axioms accept several interpretations. but not
all probability concepts satisfy the Kolmogorov axioms. In this article
I am interested in the meaning of the word 'probabilitv' as used by
physicists when they describe an event that may happen in the tÏture.
More specifically, I am interested in the peculiar meaning that this
word has in quantum mechanics and the axiomatization of this concept.
My thesis can be summarized as foliows: quantum probability is closely
related to classical determinism; its axiomatization should thus contain
classical determinism as a particular case.
The search for a conceptual framework allowing us to speak and to
think about a metaphysicai non-determinism is the main motivation for
this article. The importance of such a conceptual framework is crucial,
since many physicists (and also many philosophers), think that a real
non-determinism (one that applies also to Laplace's demon) cannot be
thought of and would be the end of physics. This prejudice is caused by
some confusion about causality, physical probabilities and Kolmogorov
axioms. The identification of the latter two, for instance, leads to the
search of the probability space (hidden variable) and to the desperate
attempt to restore a deterministic causality on that level. It also leads
to the claim that quantum mechanics describes only ensembles. One
thus tries to describe non-determinism with a formalism adapted for
epistemic probabilities. My point of view is that the Kolmogorov
axioms, although very illuminating in statistical mechanics and epis-
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temic probabilities, are not adapted for the description of the probabil-
ity of truly non-deterministic events.
In the next section I shall introduce mv concept with an example.
The concept will be formalized in Section 3. In the conclusion I stress
that the necessary mathematical structure already exists in todav's
classical and quantum physics. Moreover, if one starts from this for-
malization of what I shall cali 'propensity', the structure of classical
physics (phase space) and of quantum ph,vsics (Hilbert space) emerge
naturally.
I shall use the word 'propensitv' for the probabilistic generalization
of classical determinism that I have in mind. although it may be confus-
ing, since Sir Karl Popper (1959), who advocated a propensiti'interpre-
tation of probabiiities, claimed that classicai mechanics is not determi-
nistic. This is true from an operational point of view. However, the
way classical and quantum mechanics are non-deterministic are verv
different: for the Laplace demon, classical physics is deterministic.
whereas quantum physics remains non-deterministic. I propose to use
the word 'propensity' for the probability of a non-necessary (non-prede-
termined) physical event. This choice is supported by several of Pop-
per's citations as, for instance: "I propose a new physical hypothesis.
The two slits experiment convinced me that probabilities . . . are physi-
cal propensities, comparable to Newtonian forces . . . to realize singular
events" (Popper 1959). I accept each word of this citation, but I would
like to add: "there is no reason why this new physical hypothesis should
satisfy the oid Koimogorov axioms". At this point I shouid also mention
D. H. Mellor: "A genuine, methaphysical, indeterminism must enter
into a chance set-up. . . . If propensities are ever displayed, determinism
is false" (Mellor 1971); D. A. Gillies: "if we can correctly assert that
at least one probability system exists in reality, then it follows that at
least some objective randomness exists in the worid, and so complete
determinism is shown to be false" (Gillies 1,973); and R. N. Giere:
"Propensities are . . . causal connections with varying strengths" (Giere
1913).
2. TNTRoDUCTToN
Let me start with classical determinism versus quantum non-determin-
ism. Probabilities enter in both theories due to uncertainties about
the exact initial state of the physical system or the exact state of the
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environment. But I like to concentrate on the irreducible non-determin-
ism remaining once everything in the initial state and in the environment
is assumed to be exactly known. Maybe in a future theory nothing
would remain, but this is ciearly not the case with today's physics, and
it is reasonable to think that today's situation is likely to last and that
it cails for a better understanding. Consequently, the question is
whether it is le_eitimate to associate one prlre state with a physical
system.
In ciassical mechanics the evolution of a pure state is deterministic,
whereas the evolution of a non-pure state may be chaotic in the sense
that a state well localized in the state space may undergo very different
evolutions, apparently erratic, due to the sensitivity to the initial con-
dition. There is clearly no way to prepare a system in a pure state (i.e.,
to prepare it in such a way as to know in which pure state it is), nor
to measure it with infinite precision. Hence, the concept of a system in
a pure state is not operational. But it is nevertheless a very useful and
meaningful concept for a realist: the system is in a pure state even if
the physicist has no way to know in which one exactly. This epistemic
probability is so closely related to the mathematical theory of measure
that I hardly see any problem with it.
In quantum mechanics the situation is very different: even a pure
state can undergo non-deterministic evolutions. There remains, how-
ever, the problem of whether it is legitimate to describe a system by a
pure state. I.consider that it is relevant to describe at least some systems
by pure states. Experiments about EPR-like correlations (Einstein et
al. 1935; Clauser and Shimony 1978; Aspect et al. 1982) taught us that
one cannot arbitrarily cut the world into pieces: even spatially-separated
systems can be genuinely correlated such that only the whole can be
described by a pure state. But, precisely, the whole can be described
by a pure state, and this is used by a physicist when computing the
correlations. It seems to me that a realist can accept that there is a
level between an electron (let's say) and him, where one can cut the
world in two such that the electron together with its surroundings is in
a pure state, without genuine (quantum) correlations between the elec-
tron and him; when a realist physicist becomes conscious of an experi-
mental result, he really learns something about the electron, in contrast
to the hypothetical physicist for whom the experiment would merely
reveal some pre-existing correlations between the electron and himself.
I take seriously the idea that the physical world is non-deterministic:
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an event may happen in a closed physical system without necessity. The
present state of quantum mechanics versus hidden variables strongly
supports that the investigation of this idea is interesting.
The fact that an event is not necessary does not mean that it has no
cause. A counter that clicks, for instance, may be a non-necessary
event, but it is clearly caused by a particle detected by the counter.
Simply, the same counter, in the same circumstances. could also have
not detected the same particle. The particle is in a certain state, (un-
known, at best known to a finite precision, but this ignorance will
clearly not affect the counter), and the counter tests the presence of
the particle in a certain region of space. Together the state of the
particle and the counter determine the propensity for the event 'click'
to take place. Actuallv, the counter could have a poor efficiency, failing
to count particles that are really in the space region that the counter is
supposed to cover. We are not interested in the study of these defects.
but in the limiting case of ideal counters. we are thus led to the
conclusion that the propensity of the event is completely determined
by the state 9 of the particle and the property'a' of being in a certain
space region. But this raises the question: What is the state g of the
particle? If the answer was, 'The state is the collection of all the
propensities of all possible events', then the previous sentence would
be tautological. (Note that this concept of state is very common among
physicists. In this way they are led to represent the state of a quantum
system by a density operator 
- 
a mathematical object containing all
probabilities without distinction between epistemic ones and the 'real'
ones, that is, propensities.) For me the state of a system is something
that is really engraved into the system; the system really possesses its
state in act. Hence, following C. Piron (Piron 1976 and 1983; see also
Aerts 1981 and 1982), I define the state as the collection of all the
actual properties of the system. What else could it be? At least the
state has to contain all the actual properties. Our definition is thus a
minimal one.
Let me argue further that the above definition of state is not only a
possible one, but is the natural one. The distinction between the state,
i.e., the collection of all actual properties, and the kinematics, i.e., the
structure of the state space that determines the propensities of possible
reactions to different external circumstances, can be iilustrated as fol-
lows. Imagine a (classical) ball attached to a rail. Its state is given by
its position and velocity along the rail (the state space is two-dimen-
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sional). The kinematics determines the possibie reactions of the bail to
different external forces. To introduce the propensities in the definition
of state would be similar to the inciusion of the boundary conditions
in the state of the ball. The inclusion of all the propensities to react to
any possible external circumstances would overload the concept of
state. It would reduce its relevance by confusing the structure of the
state space with the elements of the state space. At least one should
have good arguments to put so much into that concept. It is not neces-
sary; the collection of actual properties is enough, moreover. it is close
to the concept of state in classical mechanics.
Let me summarize. First, the state contains only actual properties,
or. in Einstein's terms, elements of reality. Next, the state, i.e., these
actual properties, determine uniquely and completely the propensities
of al1 the potential properties.t Hence, the non-deterministic aspect is
compietely characterized by the deterministic aspect. This is true in
classical physics (we shall see that oniy the propensity 0 and 1 exist)
and in quantum physics (the propensity can take any vaiue between 0
and 1), and this is the characterization that I propose as the definition
of a propensity (probability of non-necessary physical events). In the
next section I make this characterization more concrete.
Let me emphasize that propensities have the same reality as pure
states and properties of classical or quantum systems. But. in real
experiments propensities will always be mixed with epistemic probabili-
ties. due to ignorance of the exact state of the system and its environ-
ment.
3. FoRMALIZATIoN
In order to present my concept of propensity as sharply as possible, I
would like to formalize it into a mathematically-rigorous framework. I
chose the iattice theory as framework, with a rather general interpreta-
tion. Other frameworks are cleariy possible. I shall be happy if the
reader admits that my choice is a possible one and that the concept can
be made precise. Only the outline of the proofs are presented below,
since the theorems are already published in Gisin (1984), but the pre-
sentation of the theorems is new.
Let me start with the assumption that the set of properties of a
physical system has the structure of a complete lattice 9. Piron (1976
and 1983) and Aerts (1931 and 1982) gave very strong arguments in
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favor of this assumption. We shall also assume that the lattice g is
ortho-modular; this is a non-obvious assumption2 (Aerts 1981 and
1982), but it is so widely used that I feel free to assume this structure
without elaborating on it. Notice that this assumption holds in classical
and quantum mechanics (with or without superselection rules). Recall
that a lattice is a set with an order relation's'such that the upper'v'
and lower'A'bounds exist. The interpretation of 'a { b'is: whenever
the property a is actual, the property b is also actual. Ortho-modular
means that the lattice I is equipped with a map I --> I such that (1)
A":e; (2) e{a')a:0, (3) a<b)a'2b', (4) a<b à3c4a',
c v a: ô. Denote aI b (read a orthogonal to b) wheneyer a< b'. As
usual, the interpretation of a I b is that the properties a and b can be
tested simultaneously, but they are never simultaneously actuai. In
classical mechanics I 
- 
g(f), the set of all subsets of the phase space
f, the order relation is given by set inclusion, the upper and lower
bounds by set union and intersection, a'=T \a' and a 
-Lb if and onlyif their intersection is empty. In quantum mechanics g: P(7(). the
set of closed linear subspaces of the Hilbert space 7(, the order relation
is given by set inclusion, the upper and lower bounds by union and
closure and by set intersection, a' ={p e 7(lp t a}, and a Lb if and
only if the vectors of a and b are mutuallir orthogonal.
When working in this framework one shouid always have the follow-
ing important mathematical result (Piron I976) in mind:
THEOREM: If g is a complete atomic ortho-modular lattice with at
least four orthogonal atoms and if I satisfies the covering law (i.e.,
p<q v s) q<p v s for all triplet of atoms p,Q,s), then 
-!4 is iso-
morphic to the direct union over a set f of Hilbertian space lattices:
9:v{P(7*)laef}.
This theorem identifies the lattices that correspond to classical (all
7(" of. dimension 1) and quantum (f : {a}, a singleton) physics; the
intermediate cases correspond to quantum mechanics with superselec-
tion rules.
We are now ready for the definition of a propensity function within
this context and some related theorems.
DEFINITION: A measure is a function f , I '[0, 1] such that:
PROPENSITIES IN A NON-DETERMINISTIC PHYSICS 293
Yai e 9,, ai L a1, i+ j) f (, ot) : ) f (at),
Va; e 9, f(o,) : 1 à/( na1) : I.
/(1) : 1.
llote 1: The interpretation is: /(a):1(â the propefiy a is actual.
l,'lote 2; Condition 2 expresses that a n b is actual (â the properties a
and à are both actual. This condition has been criticized. Bell (1966),
for instance., presented a deterministic spin 1i2 model. In this model
the properties a and ô that the spin points in direction â, respectively
6, can be simultaneously actual (i.e., the measurements of the spin in
directions â and b have both predetermined positive outcomes). In this
model, the property a n ô can thus be actual, contrary to quantum
mechanics where a n b: 0. This only proves that the property lattices
I of. quantum mechanics and of hidden variable models are different.
Notice. however. that condition 2 holds in both lattices. Note also that
some properties of the hidden variable model cannot, even in principie.
:avc for some c)-a,
one has /(0) : 0.
N{otations: For all measure f, I denote by at the smallest element of. I
with value one:
ar= A {a e 9lf(o): 1}'
I'lote:
f (a): r.
f(b)- 0<+b Lar.
DEFINITION: A propensiry function is a measure / such that:
V measure g, as: af ) g : f .
I,{ote 1: The idea is that a propensity function is uniquely determined
by the set of elements on which it assumes the value 1.
l,'lote 2: In the algebraic approach to classical and quantum physics
(Primas 1983), a propensity function can be characterized by its collec-
tion of dispersion-free observables: a propensity function is a state such
that there are no other states with the same collection of dispersion-
(1)
(2)
(3)
be tested.
l{ore 3:Since a<b)b
a<b)f(a)</(b).
l,,lote -l: Since 0 t aY a €. I,
one has
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free observables. This
pensities by the values
LEIvIMA: Let / and g
vÀ e 10, 1[,
An: Af Y As.
Proof : h(a): rcf(a): g(a): 1. Hence. h is a measure and ar,2
a7y ar. Finally, h(ayv or) :1; hence ,, ah{ a7y ar.
THEOREM: Let f and g be two measures . rf ays 4", then g is not a
propensity function.
Proof : Let h 
- 
^.f 
+ (1 
- 
À).g, oh: ag and h* g.
AXIOM 7: Ya e g, a * 0, f a measure /such that f(a) : 1.
THEOREM: If g is a propensity function, then a" is an atom of. g.
Proof: If 0 + p 4 og, then Us.t. a1{ p { as.
AXIOM 2: vae s, a+0, f a propensity function g such that g(a) :
1.
i"/ote; The propensity function associated to an atom in Axiom 2 is
necessarily unique. This axiom assumes thus that a 'Gleason theorem'(Gleason 1957) holds in 9.3
THEOREM: Let g be a ineasure.
If. a, is an atom of 9, then g is a propensity function.
Proof : Let f be the propensity function associated to a, by Axiom
2.or<as Butf(a):1) ay*0. Hence, af : a". And f :g since/is
a propensity function.
THEOREM: I is atomic.
Proof : Let 0 * a€ 9. 3 a propensity function.f s.t. f (o):1, i.e.,
a7{ a. And ay rs àrr atom.
l'{ote: Since 9is weakly modular, it is also atomistic, i.e. ,va e g, a:
v {p e glp is an atom and p < ai.
Itlotations; For all atoms p I denote gp the unique propensity function
such that go(p) : 1.
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characterization leads to the description of pro-
of pure states (Anderson 1979).
be two measures.
h: À.f + (1 
- 
À).g is a measure and
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THEOREM: Va* b e 9,3 propensity function such that g(a) + S(b).
Proof: a# b)f atom p s.t. (p < a andnot p <b) or (p<ô and
not p < a). Hence, Bo(a) : I * So(b) or go@) * l: So(b).
THEOREM: I is distributive (9 Vae I and V propensity functions
S, one has g(a) : 0 or g@): L
Proof : If .9is distributive, the following defines a propensity function
for all atoms p: Sp@): 1 if p 4 a, 0 if not. For the (L/-)' part, it is
enough to prove that Va, b e9, (av b)n à' s a n b'. Let p be an
atom s.t.p<(ot b) nb'. Since go@) €{0, I}, p La or p<a. But
p L a) p L a v b. a contradiction. Hence,, p { a.
l{ote: 9is distributive (3 9:9(f) where f is the set of atoms of 9.
The above theorem states thus that classicai mechanics is characterized
by the fact that all the propensity functions assume only the values 0 and
1. In this sense propensity is a generalization of classical determinism.
4. coNCLUSToN
I introduced and formaiized the metaphysical assumption that there is
an intermediate level between determinism and randomness, namely,
a kind of non-determinism which is completely characterized by the
actual properties of the system. I gave some arguments in favor of this
assumption, based on quantum physics, and I proposed a definition of
propensity functions in a rather general mathematical framework. Ad-
ding a very natural axiom to this framework, one gets a mathematical
structure containing both classical and quantum mechanics. The ques-
tion of whether the framework contains other structures is open.o The
discovery of a lattice satisfying the axioms of Section 3, but not the
covering law and without a physical content, would be a point against
my propensity concept.
NOTES
* It is a pleasure to thank Professors Abner Shimony and David Scharf for their criticisms
and comments about the manuscript.I Notice that the propensity that will actually show up in a specific case depends on the
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property which is tested. In the case of a counter, for instance, the state of the particle
determines the propensities of ail properties, and the counter determines that it is the
propensity of "the event ciick" that expresses itself.2 Actually, the assumption of ortho-complementarity would be enoush, since ortho-
moduiarity follows from the existence of measures (Gisin 1981).3 Axiom 2 is also true in non-separable Hilbert spaces (S. P. Gudder: 1975, Int. J. Theor.
Ph1ts. 13, p. a19) and C*-aigebras (Anderson 1979).
* I tried without success to find a lattice satisfying the axioms of Section 3, but not the
covering law. In particular the lattices based on octonionic spaces (lv{. Gùnaydin. C.
Piron and H. Ruegg: 7978, Comm. ùlath. Phvs.6I, p, 69) or "verifiable" spin-1 properties
(B.O.Hultgren and A. Shimony: 1977,J. Morh. Pftys. 18, p.381) reinforce the assump-
tion that no such lattice exists. Indeed the first one satisfies Axiom 2 and the covering
law, while the second one does not satisfy Axiom 2 nor the coverinq law. Navara (1987.
Ciechoslovak Math. J. 37, pp. 188-96) has presented an example of a finite ortho-
moduiar lattice with exactly one stâte per atom evaluating it to one, but these states do
not satisfy condition 2 of our measures.
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